The Teleological Argument
William Paley (1743-1805) was an English
and moral philosopher: He believed that the miracles on which
is based are genuine. He regarded the parts of nature as mechanisms.
form the basis of the argument from design, which he developed in his Natural
IN crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were asked how the stone came to be there, I might possibly answer, that for anything I knew to the contrary it had lain
there forever, nor would it, perhaps, be very easy to show the absurdity of this answer. But suppose I had found a watch upon the ground, and it should be inquired how the watch happened to be in that place, I should hardly think of the answer which I had before given, that for any thing I knew the watch might have always been there. Yet why should not this answer serve for the watch as well as for the stone; why is it not as admissible in the second case as in the first? For this reason, and for no other, namely, that when we come to inspect the watch, we perceive -what we could not discover in the stone-that its several parts are framed and put together for a purpose, e.g. that they are so formed and adjusted as to produce motion, and that motion so regulated as to point out the hour of the day; that if the different parts had been differently shaped from what they are, or placed after any other manner or in any other order than that in which they are placed either no motion at all would have been carried on in the machine, or none which would have answered the use that is now served by it. To reckon up a few of the plainest of these parts and of their offices, all tending to one result We see a cylindrical box contaming a coiled elastic spring, which, by its endeavor to relax itself; turns round the box We next observe a flexible chain artificially wrought for the sake of flexure communicating the action of the spring from the box to the flusee. We then find a series of wheels, the teeth of which catch in and apply to each other, conducing the motion from the flusee to the balance and from the balance to the pointer, and at the same time, by the size and shape of those wheels, so regulating that motion as to terminate in causing an index, by an equable and measured progression, to pass over a given space in a given time. We take notice that the wheels are made of brass, in order to keep them from rust; the springs of steel, no other metal being so elastic; that over the face of the watch there is placed a glass, a material employed in no other part of the work, but in the room of which, if there had been any other than a transparent substance, the hour could not be seen without opening the case. This mechanism being observed - it requires indeed an examination of the instrument, and perhaps some previous knowledge of the subject, to perceive and understand it; but being once, as we have said, observed and understood, the inference we think is inevitable, that the watch must have had a maker - that there must have existed, at some time and at some place or other an artificer or artificers who formed it for the purpose which we find it actually to answer who comprehended its construction and designed its use.
I. Nor would it, I apprehend, weaken the conclusion, that we had never seen a watch made -that we had never known an artist capable of making one that we were altogether incapable of executing such a piece of workmanship ourselves, or of understanding in what manner it was performed; all this being no more than what is true of some exquisite remains of ancient art, of some lost arts, and, to the generality of mankind, of the more curious productions of modern manufacture. Does one man in a million know how oval frames are turned? Ignorance of this kind exalts our opinion of the unseen and Unknown, but raises no doubt in our minds of the existence and agency of such an artist, at some former time and in some place or other. Nor can I perceive that it varies at all the inference, whether the question arise concerning a human agent or concerning an agent of a different species, or an agent possessing in some respects a different nature.
II. Neither secondly, would it invalidate our conclusion, that the watch sometimes went wrong, or that it seldom went exactly right. The purpose of the machinery- the design, and the designer might be evident, and in the case supposed, would be evident in whatever way - accounted for the irregularity of the movement, or whether we could account for it or not. It is not necessary that a machine be perfect, in order to show with what design it was made: still less necessary; where the only question is whether it were made with any design at all.
III. Nor thirdly, would it bring any uncertainty into the argument, if there were a few parts of the watch, concerning which we could not discover or had not yet discovered in what manner they conduced to the general effect; or even some parts, concerning which we could not ascertain whether they conduced to that effect in any manner whatever. For as to the first branch of the case if by the loss, or disorder or decay of the parts in question, the movement of the watch were found in fact to be stopped, or disturbed, or retarded, no doubt would remain in our minds as to the utility or intention of these parts, although we should be unable to investigate the manner according to which, or the connection by which, the ultimate effect depended upon their action or assistance; and the more complex the machine, the more likely is this obscurity to arise. Then, as to the second thing supposed, namely, that there were parts which might be spared without prejudice to the movement of the watch, and that we had proved this by experiment, these superfluous parts, even if we were completely assured that they were such, would not vacate the reasoning which we had instituted concerning other parts. The indication of contrivance remained, with respect to them, nearly as it was before.
IV. Nor fourthly; would any man in his
think the existence of the watch with its various machinery accounted
by being told that it was one out of possible combinations of material
forms; that whatever he had found in the place where he found the
must have contained some internal configuration or other; and that this
configuration might be the structure now exhibited, namely, of the
of a watch, as well as a different structure.
V. Nor fifthly, would it yield his inquiry more satisfaction, to be answered that there existed in things a principle of order which had disposed the parts of the watch into their present form and situation. He never knew a watch made by the principle of order; nor can he even form to himself an idea of what is meant by a principle of order; distinct from the intelligence of the watchmaker.
VI. Sixthly, he would he surprised to hear that the mechanism of the watch was no proof of contrivance, only a motive to induce the mind to think so.
VII. And not less surprised to be informed, that the watch in his hand was nothing more than the result of the laws of metallic nature. It is a perversion of language to assign any law as the efficient, operative cause of any thing. A law presupposes an agent; for it is only the mode acorrding to which an agent proceeds; it implies a power for it is the order according towhich that power acts. Without this agent, without this power, which are both distinct from itself; the law does, is nothing. The expression, "the law of metallic nature," may sound strange and harsh to a philosophic ear, but it seems quite as justifiable as some others which are more familiar to him such as "the law of vegetable nature," "the law of animal nature," or, indeed, as "the law of nature" in general, when assigned as he cause of phenomena, in exclusion of agency and power, or when it is substituted into the place of these.
VIII. Neither, lastly, would our
be driven out of his conclusion or from his confidence in its truth, by
being told he know nothing at all about the matter. He knows enough for
his argument; he knows the utility of the end; he knows the
and adaptation of the means to the end. These points being known, his
of other points, affect not the certainty of his reasoning. The
of knowing little need not beget a distrust of that which he does